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Chapter Two 
After the 25 January Revolution: Democracy or Authoritarianism in 
Egypt? 
 
Nicola Pratt 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter seeks to understand the challenges to the emergence of democratic governance 
in the aftermath of Egypt’s 25 January Revolution. Much political science scholarship as well 
as many Western politicians conceptualized the 25 January Revolution as the beginning of a 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Yet, what emerged in the period until 30 June 
2013 is a ‘grey zone’ (Carothers 2002) between democracy and authoritarianism, where the 
institutions of democracy existed in name (elections, constitutions, parliaments) but in reality 
functioned as vehicles for securing obedience to the ruling regimes of SCAF, followed by 
that of former President Mohammed Morsi. During this period, human rights abuses 
continued, security forces acted with impunity, civilians were tried before military courts and 
the constitution of December 2012 undermined rather than extended many rights (Human 
Rights Watch 2012). Millions of Egyptians participated in the June 30 uprising with the hope 
of resurrecting the original aims of the 25 January Revolution, for freedom, social justice and 
dignity (Ezzat 2013). 
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This chapter argues that the challenges facing Egyptians in achieving their aims are 
intrinsically linked to dismantling authoritarianism, which is related to the specific historical 
experiences of Egypt’s state- and nation-building processes. I build on my previous work on 
democracy and authoritarianism in the Arab world (Pratt 2007) in order to understand the 
dynamics of post-Mubarak Egypt. Within this framework, overcoming authoritarianism does 
not merely depend on crafting democratic institutions. I argue that there is a need to reassess 
the legacies of colonialism and imperialism for Egyptian identity construction and, linked to 
this, conceptions of citizenship, in order to open spaces for pluralism and inclusion.  
 
I begin by briefly critiquing mainstream political science approaches to political transitions 
for their failure to consider the different configurations of social relations that underpin 
authoritarianism and democracy. I then highlight the significance of the historical legacies of 
colonialism and anti-colonialism in the politics of constructing citizenship in Egypt and its 
relationship to normalizing authoritarianism. Subsequently, I examine the ongoing and 
incomplete 25 January Revolution in order to illustrate how historical legacies inform current 
struggles within Egypt over the nature of Egyptian citizenship and the future of the polity. 
The most significant contest revolves not around institutions or political party programmes, 
but around conceptions of Egyptian identity and linked to this, discussions over gender roles 
and relations, the position of minorities and Egypt’s relations with the West.  
 
POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
Mainstream political science scholarship explains transitions away from authoritarianism as a 
result of splits within ruling elites that enable democratic forces to mobilize at the level of 
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civil society (O’Donnell et al. 1986). Once a transition has begun, democratic consolidation 
depends on the establishment of certain prerequisites: institutions that facilitate democratic 
procedures (such as free and fair elections, and the rule of law); a political culture that 
embodies democratic values; and/or elites that follow the democratic rules of the game, 
amongst others (Schedler 1998). This literature tends to be elite-focused. Where non-elites 
play a role, it is as ‘civil society’, holding governments to account and embodying liberal 
values (Diamond 1994). 
 
Since Hosni Mubarak stepped down, commentators have sought to understand the persistence 
of authoritarianism and the limited democratization of Egyptian politics. Indeed ever since 
his ouster, timelines for handovers, elections and referenda have gone ahead despite popular 
protests against human rights abuses and continuing injustices. The actions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood after February 2011 aimed at consolidating their power rather than consolidating 
democracy. They attempted to colonize state institutions and marginalize dissenting voices as 
well as unleashing repression on protesters in the name of ‘saving the revolution’ and 
respecting the democratic will of the people (Sayed 2013; Stacher 2012).  
 
Can we explain or understand the apparent endurance of authoritarianism in Egypt by 
identifying the absence of prerequisites for democratic consolidation? Should we point to the 
lack of rule of law? Or the lack of respect amongst elites for the rules of the democratic 
game? Building on these themes, scholars and commentators have largely identified two 
obstacles to a democratic transition in Egypt: the ‘deep state’; and the behaviour of Egypt’s 
political elites.  
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The ‘deep state’ refers to the strength of the security forces and their allies within the state 
that are hostile to democracy and to democratic accountability. Their interests lie with 
authoritarian rule. The ‘deep state’, so the argument goes, remains the greatest obstacle to 
democratic consolidation, by preventing implementation of the rule of law (Amrani 2012; 
Brownlee 2011). For more than two years after the fall of Mubarak, no steps were taken to 
reform the security services in order to prevent the wide-scale abuses that happened under 
Mubarak. Moreover, there was almost no accountability for the actions of the security 
services during the eighteen day uprising or afterwards (Amnesty International 2012; Human 
Rights Watch 2013a). This provoked many protests, including massive demonstrations in 
Port Said from January through to March 2013 (Amnesty International 2013). Following the 
30 June uprising, security forces failed to prevent the killing and wounding of several tens of 
protesters (either for or against the deposed president Morsi)(Human Rights Watch 2013c), 
and may even have been responsible for many of the killings (Cairo Institute for Human 
Rights Studies and other human rights organizations 2013; Human Rights Watch 2013b), 
thereby contributing to political tensions and deadlock within Egypt. Indeed, despite its 
democratic impulses, the 30 June uprising may have facilitated a reconstitution of the ‘deep 
state’ (Jadaliyya Egypt authors 2013). 
 
A second trend among commentators and scholars has focused on the anti-democratic 
behaviour of the new ruling elites, first the SCAF, then former President Mohammed Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, which were widely considered to be the real decision makers 
during Morsi’s presidency. The SCAF’s disregard for democratic process ranged from a 
failure to empower the civilian government to the violent repression of dissent. During his 
period in power, Morsi failed to reach out to other political forces, despite his narrow 
majority in the presidential elections of June 2012. In addition, he issued a presidential decree 
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in November 2012 that concentrated powers in the hands of the president, replaced editors-in-
chief of state-owned newspapers with Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and used violence 
against those demonstrating against the new constitution (Abou-El-Fadl 2013; Al-Arian 
2012; Carothers and Brown 2012; Trager 2013). As a result, many Egyptians who voted for 
the Muslim Brotherhood and for Mohammed Morsi became disillusioned with both, giving 
impetus to the 30 June uprising, initiated by the Tamarod (or ‘rebel’) campaign (Abdel-Baky 
2013). Simultaneously, the former political opposition were also criticized in some quarters 
for its lack of unity and weakness (see (Carothers 2013) for a rebuttal of some of these 
criticisms). 
 
Whilst all of the above provide valid observations on the development of post-Mubarak 
politics, they do not help us to understand how these events came to be, despite a massive 
mobilization against the authoritarian rule of Mubarak, and continuing popular protests and 
resistance against authoritarian practices in post-Mubarak Egypt (Abou-El-Fadl 2013; Al-
Jazeera 2013b; Editors 2013; Hall 2012). The focus on the ‘deep state’ and elites—whether 
SCAF, the Muslim Brotherhood or the political opposition parties—does not fully represent 
the political dynamics of post-Mubarak Egypt, which include the role of ordinary people 
mobilizing, not only protesting on the streets, but also launching and promoting new 
initiatives within communities, workplaces, universities and other civic spaces created as part 
of the ongoing revolutionary process. Perhaps one of the most important lessons of the 2011 
uprisings, not only in the Arab world but globally, is the desire of ordinary people to redefine 
democracy away from mere adherence to political procedures and elite-led institutions 
(elections, parliaments and the judiciary), and towards a human-centred or deep democracy 
that supports the dignity of the people. This dignity encompasses human rights and freedoms, 
including social justice. Indeed, the two slogans of the 25 January demonstrations were 
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‘bread, freedom, human dignity’ and ‘bread, freedom, social justice’. In other words, politics 
cannot be reduced to the actions of political elites within formal political institutions but must 
recognize the agency of non-elite actors in shaping political outcomes. Consequently, a 
broader conceptualization of politics is necessary in order to understand political transitions.  
 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: RECONCEPUTALIZING THE 
POLITICAL  
 
In order to reconceptualise the political, I draw on the writings of the Marxist author and 
activist Antonio Gramsci. It is analytically useful to refer to Antonio Gramsci’s 
differentiation between political and civil society and the relationship between them (Gramsci 
1971). Political society includes the formal institutions to which theories of democratic 
transition refer: parliaments, executives, judiciaries, as well as the apparatus of state coercion 
(the military and the police). These institutions enable the political elite to rule through direct 
domination, including coercion. However, in order to govern effectively, and based on 
consensus, political elites need to win the hearts and minds of the citizenry. Otherwise, they 
are obliged to resort to rule through coercion, which is a costly and ineffective long-term 
strategy—as Hosni Mubarak discovered.  For Gramsci, civil society constitutes the sphere in 
which the battle for the hearts and minds of citizens is conducted (Femia 2001: 140). It 
includes those institutions, organizations and groups that are not directly governed by the 
relations of production (that is, firms) nor directly responsible for the exercise of political 
power, such as political parties, the government, the parliament and the judiciary (Gramsci 
1971: 56 n. 5). This is a sphere not merely of organizational actors, but of spaces in which 
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ideological struggle takes place—such as, the media, debating salons, places of worship and 
public squares, in addition to the family or private sphere.  
 
In other words, the power of elites depends upon their acceptance amongst the citizenry. This 
relational concept of power is termed ‘hegemony’ by Antonio Gramsci.  Hegemony exists as 
a consensus concerning the ‘naturalness’ of existing relations of power, backed by the 
coercion of the state apparatus (the police, courts, etc.). The 25 January Revolution 
demonstrated that Egyptians rejected the domination and coercion of Mubarak’s regime and 
that the latter had lost its hegemony over a large part of society. Ongoing popular protests and 
increasing popular violence after Mubarak stepped down illustrated that neither the SCAF nor 
the Muslim Brotherhood captured a sufficient number of ‘hearts and minds’ to enable them to 
rule through consensus and, instead, they were obliged to rely upon coercion. Indeed, one of 
the fundamental errors of the Muslim Brotherhood was to assume that their plurality in the 
first parliamentary elections and their victory in the first presidential elections indicated their 
hegemony over the vast majority of the population.  
 
Nevertheless, popular acts of protest and violence should not be mistaken for resistance to 
authoritarian rule, whoever is in power. We must differentiate between the act of opposing 
particular political elites, on the one hand, and the act of dismantling authoritarianism, on the 
other. In this respect, Antonio Gramsci differentiated between a ‘war of manoeuvre’ and a 
‘war of position’. A ‘war of manoeuvre’ represents an attack on the ‘outer edifices’ of the 
system of rule (for example, the regime, its policies and its institutions), whereas a ‘war of 
position’ is an attack on the ideological complex that underpins that rule (Boggs 1976: 53). 
Between 25 January and 11 February 2011, the Egyptian people waged a ‘war of manoeuvre’ 
against the regime of Hosni Mubarak, calling explicitly for his downfall. After Mubarak 
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stepped down, Egyptian people waged a war of manoeuvre against the SCAF and the Muslim 
Brotherhood/President Mohammed Morsi. 
 
A ‘war of position’, on the other hand, requires challenging a whole range of established 
ideas and practices—what Terry Eagleton (Eagleton 1991: 114) refers to as ‘culture’ in the 
widest sense—which help to normalize and naturalize the ruling regime and its system of 
power. Gramsci regarded civil society as the trenches from which social forces would wage 
their ‘war of position’ against capitalism (Gramsci 1971: 229–38). I argue that we can also 
view civil society as the sphere in which a ‘war of position’ against authoritarianism is waged 
(Pratt 2007: 13-14). Many Egyptians have been waging a war of position against 
authoritarianism for decades (Pratt 2007). This struggle greatly intensified after 2000, which 
marked the beginning of a new trend of popular mobilization (Abdelrahman 2012; El-Mahdi 
and Marfleet 2009). In 2000, a nationwide Palestine solidarity movement began by hundreds 
of students protesting against Israeli policies during the Second Intifada and popular protests, 
including an occupation of Tahrir Square, against the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Abou-
El-Fadl 2012; Schemm 2003), thereby challenging the regime’s hegemony over the public 
sphere. From 2004, new movements for political reform, such as Kefaya, emerged, as well as 
online dissent through blogging. From 2006 onwards, workers protested against pay and 
conditions (Beinin 2009). The fall of Mubarak, rather than constituting an endpoint in of 
those struggles, represented a new phase in this war of position against authoritarianism. 
 
However, there are different wars of position being waged in the post-Mubarak era, with 
implications for the unfolding of politics. There is a war against authoritarianism, which 
Egypt’s revolutionaries view as continuing despite Mubarak stepping down (Abou-El-Fadl 
2013). The idea of this war of position is encapsulated in the phrase, al-thawra mustamirra—
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‘the revolution continues’—and includes protests against, and resistance to, a range of social 
injustices. This war of position seeks to keep alive the ‘spirit of the eighteen days’, 
characterized (or even romanticized) as a space of pluralism and voluntarism, where Muslims 
and Christians, young and old, men and women, and people of different classes came 
together and governed themselves effectively and fairly.  
 
Other wars of position have been waged in the post-Mubarak era. These can be categorized 
under the single umbrella of the ‘counter-revolution’. However, their constituencies and 
discourses differ.  The Muslim Brotherhood can be considered part of the counter-revolution 
as it sought to normalize its monopoly of power and marginalize any dissent through recourse 
to religious-patriotic discourse. This war of position was represented in the narrative that the 
revolution was the eighteen-day uprising that led to the removal of Mubarak and its endpoint 
was the handover to Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, Mohammed Morsi, in 
June 2012. It also emphasized the necessity of the ‘return to normalcy’ and the ending of 
public protests, which threatened the ‘nation’ and its economy as well as undermining the 
aims of the revolution.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s war of position overlapped to a large degree with that of the 
SCAF, the latter which seeks to normalize its power through a patriotic-national security 
discourse, claiming to act in the interests of the ‘Egyptian nation’ whilst seeking to protect its 
own socio-economic and political privilege. For example, in response to massive protests 
against President Morsi on 30 June 2013, the army gave politicians 48 hours to resolve the 
political crisis, and justified its intervention based on its self-declared ‘patriotic and historic 
responsibilities to protect security and stability’ (Al-Jazeera 2013a). Despite the overlapping 
objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood and the army, the latter was ready to intervene to 
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remove the Brotherhood from power when it became clear that it was unable to stabilize 
Egypt. Finally, whilst the remnants of the Mubarak regime are considered an important 
element of the counter-revolution, they do not wage their own war of position but appear to 
operate under the guise of other counter-revolutionary forces, whether the Muslim 
Brotherhood or the armed forces and the ‘deep state’ (Haddad 2013).  
 
These struggles over the meaning and objectives of the January 25 Revolution represent 
struggles over ‘the hearts and minds’ of the Egyptian people and the definition of the future 
polity. The aim is to create a new ‘historical bloc’ (Gramsci 1971: 365-366)—that is, an 
alliance of forces and ideas that are able to govern Egypt not only by coercion but through 
consensus (that is what Gramsci termed ‘hegemony’) (Gramsci 1971: 12, 161). The 
competing discourses of different political and social actors construct different visions of 
citizenship in the ‘new Egypt’, which depend upon particular representations of Egypt and 
Egyptian-ness. These two elements, ‘Egypt’ and ‘Egyptian-ness’, are mutually constitutive 
and are intrinsic to delineating the polity and who belongs to it. In this respect, the defining of 
citizenship is dependent upon answering the question, ‘who is an Egyptian?’  
 
THE POLITICAL AND THE POST-COLONIAL PREDICAMENT 
 
Why should Egyptians quarrel with each other about their identity? … 
Whenever there is an acute crisis regarding Egypt’s political direction and its 
socio-political set-up, it turns into a search for something broader and 
deeper—a ‘soul’ and a ‘fabric’ (Abdulla 1999: 172–3). 
The question of ‘who is an Egyptian?’ has a particular complexity in light of the legacy of 
colonialism and the struggle against it.  The construction of an idea of ‘national difference’ 
11 
 
constituted an important means of resisting European colonial power amongst colonized 
countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. It depended upon the construction of a binary 
opposition between ‘us’ (the colonized) and ‘them’ (the colonizer). As Partha Chatterjee 
(Chatterjee 1993) argues, the construction of national difference depends upon the 
formulation of an identity and culture that is deemed exclusive and different from those of 
other nations. The logic of national difference entails recourse to ‘essences’ that deny 
difference within nations (Chatterjee 1993): 6), and seeks to ‘cleanse’ the national 
culture/identity from ‘alien’ influences. This logic operates to suppress pluralism, reject 
cosmopolitanism and erase (not in the sense of eliminate but rather in the sense of glossing 
over) inequalities and injustices within the nation, whether based on class, gender, ethnicity 
or religion—all in the name of protecting national unity against the ‘Other’. The strands of 
nationalist thinking that emerged and strengthened in Egypt between the First and Second 
World Wars, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Young Egypt party, generally 
illustrate these features (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997).  
 
In the post-independence period, continued interventions by the Great Powers compounded 
the inequalities of the global political economy and undermined the sovereignty of formerly 
colonized countries to different degrees. In this context, the discourse of national difference 
was reproduced in order to challenge continuing Western intervention and to mobilize efforts 
for Egypt’s national modernization. In Egypt, the discourse of ‘national difference’ was 
produced through Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab ideology as it sought to mobilize 
resistance to the West, not only within Egypt but also across the Arab world, as well as to 
rally the ‘productive’ sectors of society at home. Whilst Nasser’s rule helped to bring about 
significant socio-economic progress to Egypt, nevertheless, the discourse of pan-Arabism 
helped to normalize the coercive and authoritarian powers of the post-independence Egyptian 
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regime. It suppressed dissent, only recognizing those political, economic and social demands 
that supported regime-directed modernization (Abdel-Malek 1962; Beinin 1989; Pratt 2007: 
40-45). Nevertheless, despite this suppression of dissent, Nasser enjoyed widespread support 
(El-Din 1995: 238).  
 
Thus in order to produce a fixed, monolithic identity, elites have constructed cultural borders, 
which are policed, both literally and discursively, to maintain unity in the face of the 
neo/colonial ‘Other’. After the 1967 defeat, and with the coming to power of President 
Anwar al-Sadat, pan-Arabism gave way to Egyptian nationalism. Paradoxically, despite his 
re-orientation of foreign policy towards the West, foreign influences over national culture and 
identity have continued to be represented as ‘dangerous’ to the nation. Yet it is also clear that, 
as a result, state elites can construct those ideas and practices that it believes are threatening 
to it – such as human rights and women’s rights – as ‘foreign’ and, therefore, threatening to 
the nation. Indeed, some human rights and women’s rights violations have even been justified 
on the grounds of protecting the nation against cultural imperialism (Pratt 2005). The 
counterpart of the ‘dangerous foreigner’ is the domestic ‘fifth column’ that threatens the 
‘fabric’ of the nation, or its progress, through its particularistic rights claims. Such 
accusations have been leveled at Coptic Christians as well as workers at different moments in 
Egypt’s post-independence history and are also implicit in criticisms from some quarters of 
protests by these groups in the post-Mubarak period.  
 
I argue that a ‘war of position’ against authoritarianism depends upon the reconstruction of an 
Egyptian identity that addresses in new ways the question of relations with the West and 
accommodates differences within the nation based on gender, sexuality, ethnicity and 
religion. In this way, democratization represents a project not only of advocating political 
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reforms but also a new worldview that breaks down the dichotomies of us/them and 
authentic/foreign that have helped to suppress pluralism and sustain authoritarianism. The 
establishment of democratic rules and institutions without attempts to articulate a new vision 
of Egyptian identity and belonging can simply lead to a transition away from authoritarian 
rule towards what Tom Carothers has called a ‘grey zone’: neither authoritarianism nor 
democracy (Carothers 2002). 
 
Here, I focus on the following themes within public debates in the post-Mubarak period: 1) 
the role of religion in the public sphere (or the relationship between Egyptian-ness and 
Muslim-ness); 2) linked to this, the position of the Coptic Christian community; 3) the 
relationship between Egypt and the West; and 4) the position of women.1 I examine what 
these debates tell us about the construction of a new citizenship in Egypt and the potential for 
democracy in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
 
The Role of Religion in The Public Sphere 
 
Although many commentators refer to previous Egyptian regimes as secular, religion has 
long played a role in Egyptian public life, not least because personal status issues have 
always been determined by shari‘a. The religious source of personal status laws, which 
govern the most intimate of spaces within the nation state, are an essential part of ‘national 
difference’, in that they have enabled previous regimes, from that of Gamal Abdel-Nasser to 
that of Hosni Mubarak, to present themselves as protectors of the ‘authentic’ Egyptian family 
and its values as the bedrock of national culture (Hijab 1988). Whilst there has been a 
persistent presence of Islam in the public sphere in the post-independence era, regimes have 
subordinated Islam to the state by making religious clerics state employees, calling on Al-
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Azhar to legitimize government policies through supportive fatwas and by criminalizing 
independent religious associations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928 in resistance to British colonial rule and what 
Hassan al-Banna, the founder, viewed as an invasion of Western cultural values (Sullivan and 
Abed-Kotob 1999: 41). Despite cooperating with the Free Officers to overthrow the 
monarchy in 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood was side-lined from power by the new regime 
then, following an attempt on Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s life, banned in 1954 (Sullivan and 
Abed-Kotob 1999: 43). Its members were arrested and tortured and its leaders executed. 
Under Sadat, there was a rapprochement between the authorities and the Brotherhood, as 
Sadat sought to use the Islamists to defeat the leftists. However, under Mubarak, Brotherhood 
members were periodically rounded up and detained, and even put on trial before emergency 
courts.  
 
Recognising the need to rejuvenate the group and its fortunes, the Muslim Brotherhood 
announced a political reform plan in March 2004, which included calls for an end to the 
emergency law, a check on presidential powers, releasing political prisoners and rotation of 
political power through clean elections (El-Din 2004). The adoption of political reform 
demands facilitated the Muslim Brotherhood’s alliance with some political forces, mainly 
leftists, in the National Coalition for Reform (NCR), which was part of a wider movement for 
political reform that emerged under Mubarak, grouped under the Kifaya umbrella (Abdel-
Latif 2005). Whilst this particular movement failed to achieve its objectives of introducing 
political reforms under Mubarak, it contributed to the growing terrain of dissent that led to 
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the 25 January Revolution and to a strategic alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
leftists. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, and a handful of Salafi parties 
(notably the Nur Party), won a majority of seats in the November and December 2011 
parliamentary elections. The constitution drafting process, which followed the parliamentary 
elections, rather than representing an opportunity for consensus-building between different 
political groupings over the future of Egypt, created polarization between Islamists and 
secular-oriented political leaders. This polarization should be not necessarily be attributed to 
contestations over the presence of religion in the public sphere. As Nathan Brown and Clark 
Lombardi (Lombardi and Brown 2012) noted at the time, there was consensus amongst 
Islamists and non-Islamists over Article 2 (‘that the principles of sharia are the principal 
source of legislation’).  
 
Rather, the contestations over the constitution may be characterized as a division over 
whether majoritarianism or pluralism should become the defining feature of Egypt’s future 
polity. On the one hand, the Islamists, having won the majority of seats in parliamentary 
elections, believed that they were representative of the majority of Egyptians and  that this 
gave them the legitimacy to dominate the constituent assembly responsible for drafting 
Egypt’s new constitution and to determine Egypt’s future polity. On the other side, secular 
opposition parties and many groups within civil society opposed what they saw as the 
Islamist monopolization of the constitution drafting process.  
 
The majoritarian stance on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood was particularly shocking 
given that this group had previously allied with other forces for democratic reform under the 
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Mubarak regime and raised concerns that the Islamists merely aimed to change the personnel 
ruling the state rather than change the structures of the state itself (for example, see (Sabry 
2012). Several civil society actors opposed the constitution draft for supporting ‘the 
cornerstones of political tyranny by adopting a system which enshrines massive powers for 
the presidency, as was the case prior to January 25, 2011…. [and leaving] the door wide open 
to the creation of a religious state, which poses severe challenges to rights and freedoms’ 
(Several Egyptian human rights organizations 2012) and for its failure to explicitly protect 
gender equality (Samir 2013). Artists and writers raised concerns that the new constitution 
would place limits on freedom of expression (Mosireen 2012; Shaw 2013). Their objections, 
embedded within a liberal approach to rights and autonomy, are nevertheless simultaneously 
framed in terms of the failure of the constitution to reflect the aspirations of the revolution. 
Their positions contrast with the approach of the Islamists (as well as the military and 
previous Egyptian regimes), which emphasizes the interests of ‘the nation’, whether its 
morality, its security or its stability, over the rights of individual Egyptian citizens.  
 
Secular political leaders challenged the domination of Islamists in the constituent assembly 
through the Supreme Court. Along the road of challenges and counter-decrees by the elected 
President Morsi, secular as well as Coptic members of the committee gradually withdrew in 
protest against the way in which, they believed, the Islamists were forcing through their will. 
In the end, on 22 November 2012, President Morsi used his executive powers, inherited from 
Mubarak, to force the constituent assembly to complete the draft constitution in time for a 
public referendum on 15 December 2012. It was approved with a two-thirds majority, but the 
low turn-out undermined the legitimacy of the document. 
 
17 
 
For many, this debate was not only one over process and rights but also over the identity of 
Egypt. The Islamist domination of the constitution drafting process raised questions within 
civil society over the nature of Egyptian identity. Islamic? Pharaonic? Mediterranean? Arab? 
For the Islamists, the constitution safeguarded the Islamic character of Egypt. For Egypt’s 
more cosmopolitan citizens, Egypt’s historical identity is a tapestry of different identities 
(Osman 2012), as explored by Egyptian artists and musicians Khaled Hafez, Maged Mekhail, 
Amir Ramses, amongst others (Ahram Online 2013c; Elkamel 2013a; Elkamel 2013b).  
 
What the debate over the constitution demonstrates is that the role of religion in public life 
per se is not disputed. Rather, divisions between Islamists and non-Islamists were concerned 
about the nature of the polity (majoritarian or pluralistic) and also about whether Egyptian 
identity and, linked to this citizenship rights, should be defined primarily by religion or not. 
For the Islamists, their gains in parliamentary elections justified their monopolization of the 
constitution drafting process and the constitution’s content. For non-Islamists, the 
constitution drafting process demonstrated an attempt to suppress Egypt’s social and political 
diversity and to replicate the authoritarian structures of the Mubarak regime.  
 
The Position of Minorities within The Nation 
 
The question of the position of Coptic Christian citizens of Egypt has historically been a 
contentious and sensitive issue. In the latter stages of the Ottoman empire, European powers 
claimed tutelage over Christian minorities in the Middle East as part of their encroachment 
into the empire. As colonial powers, the Europeans distinguished Muslims from Christians in 
a ‘divide and rule’ strategy. In the struggle against the British occupation, many Egyptian 
nationalists made a concerted effort to break down religious divisions and unify the people as 
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Egyptians. Since then, previous regimes, as well as many Egyptian citizens, have argued 
against the use of the term ‘minority’ to describe the Copts (Abdel-Latif 2000) and, instead, 
insist that ‘Copts are part of the Egyptian national fabric’. However, this position often 
operates to gloss over the official and unofficial discrimination that occurred and continues to 
occur against Copts. Under Mubarak, those who argued that Copts were victims of 
discrimination were accused of inciting sectarianism and of inviting Western interference in 
Egypt’s domestic matters (Pratt 2005).  
 
During the uprising, the theme of Copts and Muslims protesting side by side was a constantly 
recurring one. Street graffiti around Cairo shows the Muslim crescent and the Christian cross 
intertwined or side by side. However, despite the rhetoric of multi-faith unity, attacks against 
Coptic churches have continued in the post-Mubarak period (Tadros 2011).  Some of these 
have been sparked by rumours that Muslim women are being kidnapped, held in churches 
and forced to convert (Ahram Online 2013a). The military council, the Morsi presidency and 
state security all failed to stop attacks on Copts (Kingsley 2013; Tadros 2011), whilst some 
media commentators have denied that these attacks have a sectarian motivation (Tadros 
2011).  
 
Most worryingly, in October 2011, the military, security forces, as well as state media, were 
implicated in violence against mainly Coptic protesters outside the state media building in 
Cairo–called the Maspero Massacre – which resulted in the deaths of at least 25 protesters 
and left over 200 injured. They had been protesting against the failure of state authorities to 
investigate the burning of another church. The Maspero events themselves as well as 
reactions to them illustrate both continuity with, and change from, pre-revolution Egypt. On 
the one hand, the military denied that it had shot at and run over protesters, and even claimed 
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that military personnel had come under attack (Ibrahim 2012). On the other hand, there was a 
huge uproar from activists and different sections of civil society, condemning the violence of 
the military and state security forces and the incitement by state media, as well as calling for 
justice for Copts (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and 20 other organizations 2011; 
Gundy and Tarek 2011). These reactions to the Maspero events, and other instances of 
violence against Christians, are indicative of the desires of many activists to address the 
position of Copts not just as a slogan but also as an integral part of the transformation of 
Egypt from authoritarianism and towards freedom and pluralism. 
 
The Maspero events were also indicative of a new trend amongst Copts themselves. By going 
out to protest, beginning with the 25 January Revolution and continuing after Mubarak 
stepped down, many Copts defied the appeal of Pope Shenouda not to protest. In so doing, 
they were, argues Paul Sedra (2012), rebelling against the ‘modern millet partnership’ that 
characterized relations between the Church and the Mubarak regime. The ‘modern millet 
partnership’ placed Copts within a double communal bind in which they were subordinated to 
the Church which, in turn, was subordinated to the ruler. The 2012 constitutional article 
making ‘the canon principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews’ the ‘main source of legislation 
for personal status laws, religious affairs and the selection of their religious leaders’ 
represented an attempt to perpetuate the ‘modern millet partnership’ in the post-Mubarak era. 
Sedra (2012: 38) suggests that it is the rise of Coptic lay activism that contributed to the 
decision by the Church to withdraw from the Constituent Assembly, despite its desire to see 
its authority over Coptic community matters enshrined.  
 
The wars of position being waged over the question of the position of Copts within the 
Egyptian nation and polity are not drawn along religious differences (Muslim versus 
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Christian) or according to secularists versus Islamists. Rather, this war of position may be 
categorized as pitting those who believe in communal attitudes that subordinate the rights of 
individuals and minorities to the collective against those who believe in individual freedoms 
and, linked to this, more pluralistic notions of the nation.  
 
The Relationship between Egypt and the West 
 
National identity construction in the post-independence period in Egypt has occurred against 
the backdrop of colonial and neo-colonial domination of the Middle East region. Against this 
backdrop, from the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser to that of Morsi, there has often existed a 
rejection or suspicion of ‘cultural’ influences that are deemed ‘Western’ or ‘alien’ to ‘Arab–
Muslim culture’, as dangerous and threatening. Whilst not dismissing the use of culture and 
norms by Western governments as a sort of ‘soft power’, nevertheless, fears of the West have 
been used by different Egyptian governments to stoke opposition to dissent.  
 
Human rights and women’s rights groups in Egypt, from the 1990s onwards, have been and 
continue to be at the centre of debates about links to the West, particularly through the receipt 
of funds from Western donors (Pratt 2005; Pratt 2006; Pratt 2007: 148-151). Consequently, 
rights groups, not only in Egypt but in other Arab countries, have been involved in debates 
about the Islamic sources of human rights or women’s rights and/or over their ‘authenticity’ 
and, linked to this, their legitimacy (Dwyer 1991). Under Mubarak, the government used 
widespread suspicion of the West to justify imposing controls over Egyptian non-
governmental organizations’ (NGOs’) fund-raising (Pratt 2004). During the eighteen day 
uprising, the Mubarak regime unsuccessfully attempted to discredit the protesters in Tahrir 
Square as ‘foreign agents’. 
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This tactic of the former regime has also been in play since Mubarak stepped down. From the 
summer of 2011, SCAF began waging a campaign against NGOs and foreign funding. It 
accused the 6 April Youth Movement, which had played an important role in mobilizing 
protesters since its founding in 2008, of being trained in the United States and Serbia to carry 
out ‘subversive’ activities in Egypt. In December 2011, offices of the National Democratic 
Institute, International Republican Institute, Konrad Adenauer Foundation and other groups 
were raided and 43 employees arrested. The foreign nationals were allowed to leave the 
country whilst the remaining fourteen Egyptian employees (and one US citizen who remained 
in solidarity) faced charges of illegally receiving foreign funding—a charge that carries a 
prison sentence. Whilst it is true that these NGOs were technically operating without a 
licence, the defence argued that they had been operating with the full knowledge of the 
Egyptian government (Ahram Online 2013b). In June 2013, the NGO workers were found 
guilty of operating without a licence and receiving foreign funding (Loveluck 2013).  
 
The NGOs were portrayed in much of the Egyptian state media as foreign spies who sought 
to undermine the gains of Egypt’s revolution and who even threatened Egypt’s national 
security. Many have argued that the aim of SCAF was to undermine pro-democracy and 
human rights NGOs in general, who were monitoring SCAF’s human rights abuses (Fahmy 
2012).  Indeed, the trial of the NGO workers coincided with efforts to introduce a new NGO 
bill that would further control the activities of civil associations (Carr and Mohsen 2012). 
 
A similar campaign to control foreign funding of Egyptian NGOs has also been part of 
Morsi’s presidency. An NGO law proposed by the Shura Council in March 2013 prohibited 
Egyptian NGOs from receiving funds from abroad and subjected foreign NGOs to stringent 
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monitoring, in the name of preventing foreign NGOs from operating as ‘spies’ in Egypt and 
ensuring that Egyptian NGOs contribute to national development goals (El-Din 2013a). 
The debates triggered by NGOs and foreign funding illustrate long-running divisions not only 
between civil society and the regime but also within civil society. These debates are more 
than issues concerning the regulation of funding and NGO activities but are essentially about 
the nature of Egypt’s future polity. On one side are those who support a ‘fortress Egypt’ and 
believe that Egyptian sovereignty can only be protected by policing the nation’s cultural 
borders and subordinating civil society to the aims of the nation. This group views not only 
foreigners but those Egyptians who adopt ‘foreign’ values or ideas as threatening to those 
aims. On the other side are those who support a more pluralistic Egypt, often viewing Egypt 
within a more cosmopolitan frame, but also valuing the independence of civil society and 
political dissent. The issue of foreign funding, which significantly supports the activities of 
Egyptian NGOs, is a discursive as well as coercive means of disciplining dissent and 
buttressing authoritarianism.   
 
Gender and the Nation 
 
As noted above, the issue of women’s role in society and the definition of Egyptian 
womanhood was an area of public debate in the drafting of the constitution, particularly for 
women’s rights activists. Representations of women, whether through media, art or state laws 
and constitutions, are an essential part of defining national identity and national difference, as 
well as markers between ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Yuval-Davis 1997). In contexts of revolution and 
regime change, the representation of women and the notion of ‘authentic’ womanhood are 
often used in political discourse to differentiate the new regime from the old. The case of 
Egypt is no different. Different representations of femininity and contrasting notions of 
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Egyptian womanhood have been part of defining the revolution, its aims and the nature of the 
future Egyptian polity.  
 
The ‘empowered revolutionary woman’, protesting in Tahrir Square, was a regular feature of 
images of the 25 January uprising. Egyptian women stressed that ‘women and men stood side 
by side in the revolution’ calling for the downfall of Mubarak. However, as the post-Mubarak 
era has unfolded, the legitimacy of the Egyptian female revolutionary has been increasingly 
contested through the use of sexualized violence against women protesters. The SCAF 
undertook ‘virginity tests’ against women revolutionaries, widely condemned by Egyptian 
and international human rights organizations. The video of a woman being dragged across the 
street and beaten by security police, having lost her over-shirt in the process, has become an 
iconic image of SCAF violence. The shock of the violence was intensified by the fact that the 
woman had been wearing a veil, which was tugged away from her body. In January and 
February 2013, there was an alarming increase in sexual assaults against women protesters in 
and around Tahrir Square during demonstrations marking the second anniversary of the 
revolution. Women came forward to give testimonies publicly describing how large gangs of 
men surrounded women, ripping away their clothes and grabbing and violating their bodies. 
The violence and harassment experienced by these women protesters is tragically ironic given 
the representation of Tahrir Square as a ‘sexual harassment free zone’ during the eighteen 
days of the uprising.  
 
Many activists claim that the violence against women is organized, including by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, to intimidate women from protesting (al-Masriya 2013). Whoever is 
responsible for this violence, women’s rights activists have argued that there is a widespread 
complicity or denial amongst authorities and political leaders across the spectrum regarding 
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the phenomenon (Nazra for Feminist Studies 2013). The violent targeting of women operates 
to terrorize women out of the public sphere as well as to delegitimize women protesters. 
Islamists in the Shura Council have blamed female protesters ‘who insist on demonstrating 
with men in unsecure areas’ for the violence they experience (El-Din 2013b). Public violence 
against women operates to (re-)define the ‘authentic’ Egyptian woman as one who respects 
rather than challenges the existing gender order. Amongst Islamists as well as members of the 
military and other conservative trends, women’s modest behaviour is symbolic of the 
Egyptian nation, whilst those women who transgress these norms ‘deserve’ to be punished. A 
senior Egyptian general justified the virginity tests as necessary to prevent female protesters 
from accusing the military of rape and told CNN that the arrested women ‘were not like your 
daughter or mine. These were girls who had camped out in tents with male protesters’ (Amin 
2011). The use of violence against women is even justified in terms of maintaining 
‘authentic’ values and resisting ‘foreign’ cultural invasion. The Egyptian government’s 
opposition to a United Nations declaration against violence against women at the 
Commission on the Status of Women in New York in March 2013 was based on its content 
contradicting ‘Muslim values’ and the Egyptian family (Elsadda 2013).  
 
Public violence against women also plays an important counter-revolutionary role by 
terrorizing women out of the public sphere. Women’s participation in the 25 January 
Revolution has been represented by Islamists and other conservatives as a temporary 
necessity to rectify the gender order that had been reversed under Mubarak’s regime, as a 
result of decades of dictatorship and impoverishment. The need to restore a lost gender order 
is implied by Asmaa Mahfouz in her impassioned plea, which went viral on YouTube at the 
beginning of 2011. In which she said: ‘If you think yourself a man, come with me on 25 
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January. Whoever says that women should not go to protests because they will get beaten, let 
him have some honour and manhood and come with me on 25 January’ (Mahfouz 2011).  
 
In challenging Egypt’s men to join her in demonstrations, Mahfouz provided an implicit 
critique of the state of gender under Mubarak’s regime, suggesting that men had become like 
women, whilst, women like her had become like men. Whether or not Mahfouz’s words had a 
widespread impact, the reclaiming of masculine dignity was a leitmotif amongst the 
protesters in Tahrir Square.2 The restoration of this masculine dignity depended upon a 
reestablishment of a gender hierarchy, rather than its dismantlement. The forcible exclusion 
of women from demonstrations through violence functions to mark the end of the 
‘revolutionary process’ (and, with it, demands for social justice and accountability for past 
regime crimes) and a return to ‘normalcy’, including normative gender relations. 
 
In response to this violence against women, revolutionaries have promoted their own counter-
narratives and images of women. The case of Samira Ibrahim, who launched a court case 
against the military for being subjected to so-called virginity tests by the SCAF, has been 
vocally supported by revolutionaries, and her bravery has been celebrated through graffiti 
images. Another ubiquitous graffiti image was that of sitt al-banat (‘the dearest of girls’), 
representing the woman (mentioned above) who was dragged across the street and beaten by 
the police. Through these representations, women are reinscribing their victimization as 
resistance against dictatorship, and in the process redefining ‘authentic’ Egyptian 
womanhood.  
 
The war of position over women’s role in the post-Mubarak era is part of defining Egyptian 
identity and the future of Egypt’s polity. On one side are those who seek to establish 
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‘traditional’ gender norms and limit Egypt’s revolution to the holding of elections and the 
introduction of a new government. On the other are those who seek to challenge so-called 
traditional gender norms and continue the revolution so that it addresses objectives of social 
justice, including gender justice. The discursive discrediting of female revolutionaries 
through their association with ‘inauthentic’ values, as well as efforts to subdue them through 
sexualized violence, are together central to a strategy of suppressing pluralism and 
cosmopolitanism, as well as undermining individual rights and dignity.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The obstacles to deeper democracy in Egypt cannot be reduced to a focus on institutions, 
sequencing and political elites—without recourse to an implicit essentialization of Egyptian 
politics and society. In order to understand the reproduction of authoritarianism and 
resistance to it, one must look at the debates and contestations within civil society over the 
identity of Egypt and, linked to this, the nature of the future Egyptian polity. These debates 
over Egypt’s identity have their roots in the colonial experiences of Egypt and the challenges 
of building an independent and sovereign nation state. The 25 January Revolution constitutes 
an attempt on the part of many within civil society to reassess Egypt’s past in order to rethink 
Egypt’s future.  
 
Tracing the contours of some of the debates in the post-Mubarak era, we see competing wars 
of position being waged between majoritarian versus pluralist visions of politics and society; 
‘authentic’ versus cosmopolitan cultures and identities; and communal versus liberal-
individual frames of reference. Gender, religion and nation intersect and are fixed in different 
ways by these competing discourses. Majoritarian and ‘authentic’ notions of Egyptian 
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identity and culture align with conservative gender norms; the subordination of rights and 
freedoms of religious minorities and other dissenting groups to the majority (whether defined 
in national or religious terms or both); and the rejection of ideas and influences deemed 
‘foreign’. Citizenship rights depend upon performing ‘the authentic’ Egyptian identity and 
respecting the majority position. Those who step out of line may expect punishment. This 
more or less characterizes the position of the Islamists, as well as the military, and may even 
describe some secular political leaders, particularly following the 30 June uprising, with the 
National Salvation Front (the previous political opposition) affirming its support for the 
Egyptian military’s so-called ‘war against terrorism’ (Salem 2013) despite evidence of 
disproportionate violence used against pro-Morsi protesters (as mentioned above).  
 
Pluralist/cosmopolitan notions of Egyptian identity and more liberal-individual approaches to 
rights can be found (not necessarily simultaneously or consistently) across a range of actors 
within civil society, including self-identified revolutionaries, feminists, human rights 
activists, artists, writers, Coptic Christian rights activists as well as some members of the 
secular opposition parties. Through their celebration of religious and cultural differences and 
their attempts to challenge gender hierarchies, they contribute to challenging monolithic 
representations of Egyptian identity that impose unity to the detriment of the rights of 
individual citizens and open up spaces for pluralism, diversity and inclusiveness within the 
new Egypt. Without a consensus within civil society that rejects notions of majoritarianism 
and authenticity, it will be easy for authorities to erode civil and political rights (either on 
paper or in practice) on the grounds of ‘national security’ and/or protecting ‘the nation’ from 
the ‘Other’ (whether internal or external).  
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The January 25 Revolution did not mark the beginning of a democratic transition but rather 
the dramatic next phase in the ongoing efforts of many civil society actors to resist 
authoritarianism. The outcome of the presidential elections and constitutional referendum in 
2012 demonstrated that neither the revolutionaries nor the Muslim Brotherhood nor any other 
political force had yet won over a critical mass to their side and were able to govern Egypt. 
Events following the June 30 uprising have illustrated that the military continues to play a 
key role in Egyptian politics and that the remnants of the Mubarak regime, most notably state 
security, have not been defeated. Those seeking to dismantle authoritarianism have a long 
struggle ahead. One of the greatest threats to achieving the objectives of the uprising (‘bread, 
freedom and social justice’) and to establishing a deep democracy in Egypt would be the 
failure of civil society to continue its resistance against authoritarianism. For a long time, 
civil society in the Arab world was a space in which consent for the rule of authoritarian 
regimes was manufactured. Now, civil society has become the space in which 
authoritarianism is being contested, resisted and, hopefully, dismantled. The revolution 
continues. 
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1 For reasons of space, I do not discuss here the debate over workers’ protests and rights in 
the post-Mubarak period. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Sallam, H. 2011. 
'Striking back at Egyptian workers'. Middle East Report, 41, 20-5; and Marie Duboc in this 
volume. Support for workers’ demands is essential to the achievement of social justice in 
Egypt and attempts to suppress them.  
2 See the images in Khalil, K. 2011. Messages from Tahrir: Signs from Egypt's Revolution, 
Cairo, American University in Cairo Press. for examples of the gendered frames of protest in 
Tahrir Square. 
